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erative prescription is that time runs against a person only when
he has a right of action and does not exercise it, and in the case
of a wrongful seizure the rights of the parties are not finally
determined until the rendition of judgment on this point. Secondly, the claim for damages includes the illegal detention (as
well as the seizure) and the amount of damages cannot be fixed
until the period of wrongful detention is ascertained.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
The companion cases of Reagan v. Murphy' and Jones v. Sun
Oil Company2 presented for determination the question whether
or not the liberative prescription of ten years could be properly
applied to a mineral lease. This question was answered in the
negative in the Reagan case, and that decision governed the
Jones case. In the Reagan case, the plaintiff's vendor, in 1941,
granted a mineral lease covering some 19,000 acres on several
non-contiguous tracts for a primary term of ten years. In 1942,
vendor sold to plaintiff a 40 acre tract, subject to the lease, and
reserved the mineral rights. There was production on some of
the tracts within the primary term and therefore the lease was
in full effect beyond its primary term, at least as to those producing tracts. However, there had been no drilling operations
on plaintiff's 40 acre tract, which was non-contiguous to the producing property, and the mineral servitude thereon prescribed.
In 1954 plaintiff sued for cancellation of the lease insofar as it
affected his tract on grounds of prescription. In reversing the
lower court's decision that the mineral lease was prescribed as
to the plaintiff's tract by ten years non-usage, the Supreme
Court held that ten-year liberative prescription of mineral servitudes or real rights does not apply to a mineral lease. The court
said a mineral lease -creates only personal rights, and R.S.
9:1105, 3 even in its amended form, did not have the effect of
changing these rights from personal to real rights. Since Arent
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Robert
F. LeBlanc for his work in the preparation of these materials.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
2. 235 La. 554, 105 So.2d 219 (1953).
3. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) : "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and contracts
applying to and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas, or'other
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v. Hunter4 and the passage of the above-mentioned statute this
is the first case to consider whether ten-year liberative prescription applies to mineral leases. It was thought, after the 1950
amendment to the statute, that there could be no doubt that the
purpose of the amendment was to classify a mineral lease as a
real right or immovable for all purposes.5 The court reasoned
that since the statute only classified and considered mineral
leases as real rights or immovable property, the legislature could
not have intended that a mineral lease created real rights. In
the Civil Code, however, these same terms are used. Article 471
provides that a servitude is considered as immovable from the
object to which it applies.0 Article 470 provides that incorporeal things, consisting only in a right, are placed in classes of
movables or immovables according to the object to which they
apply.7 Article 2015 states that not only servitudes, but leases
and all, other rights which the owner imposes on his land before
alienating the soil, form real obligations." In view of the above
and the history of the statute, it is difficult to find more appropriate language to brand a mineral lease as a real right, if indeed, such had been the intent of the legislature. Aside from
its rationale, the practical effect of the decision is that it possibly reveals a method of circumventing the public policy of the
mineials to possession, together with the rights, privileges, and obligations resulting therefrom, are classified as real rights and incorporeal immovable property.
They may be asserted, protected, and defended in the same manner as may be
the ownership or possession of other immovable property by the holder of these
rights, without the concurrence, joinder, or consent of the landowner, and without
impairment of rights of warranty, in any action or by any procedure available
to the owner of immovable property or land. This Section shall be considered as
substantive as well as procedural so that the owners of oil, gas and other mineral
leases and contracts within the purpose of this Section shall have the benefit of
all laws relating to the owners of real rights in immovable property or real estate."
4. 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931).
5. INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 37, 62 (Louisiana State University 1953).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 471 (1870) : "The following are considered as immov-

able from the object to which they apply:
"The usufruct and use of immovable things.
"A servitude established on an immovable estate.
.''An action for the recovery of an immovable estate or an entire succession."
7. Id. art. 470: "Incorporeal things, consisting only in a right, are not of
themselves strictly susceptible of the quality of movables or immovables; nevertheless. they are placed in one or the other of these classes, according to the object
to which they apply and the rules hereinafter established."
& Id. art. 2015: "Not only servitudes, but leases and all other rights, which
the owner had imposed on his land before the alienation of the soil, form real
obligations which accompany it in the hands of the persons who acquires it, although he have made no stipulation on the subject, or they be not mentioned in
the act of transfer. The purchaser may, if the circumstances permit it, have relief
against the seller for concealment of such charges; but the law establishes the
rule that no one can transfer a greater right than he himself has, except where
the, neglect of some formality required by law has subjected the owner of the real
incumbrance to a loss of his right, in favor of a creditor or bona fide purchaser."
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state, which policy is that control of mineral rights should not
be separated from ownership of the soil for more than ten years
without proper use or development. It now appears possible
to acquire a mineral lease for a period in excess of ten years and
hold that property out of commerce by paying delay rentals for
the term of the lease.
In Johnson v. Smallenberger,9 the plaintiff-lessor had granted
an "unless" type lease to the defendant-lessee. On the rental paying date the lessee, through an oversight, neglected to pay the
rental, for which amount he had previously made out the necessary check and was holding it. Plaintiff demanded cancellation
for non-payment of rentals and defendant immediately forwarded the check which plaintiff refused to accept. Suit followed for cancellation. The defendant argued first that the
lease remained in force by offer of payment of rentals just as
soon. as the "mistake" was discovered because equity requires
that the lessor should promptly inform the lessee of the mistake
and give the latter an opportunity to correct it before forfeiture
can be demanded. Secondly, defendant argued that plaintiff
knew that a well was being drilled in a drilling unit and had
waited to see if the well was successful before demanding. cancellation, and therefore plaintiff was estopped. The court distinguished the Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co.10 and the Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company" cases. The court
said that the instant case involved an "unless" type lease and
that under that type lease "the lessee is under no duty either to
drill or to pay delay rentals; if he either drills or pays, the lease
remains in effect, but if he does neither, it ipso facto terminates
at the time of default." As to the estoppel argument, the court
said that to give rise to estoppel by silence or inaction, there
must not only be an opportunity to speak but also an obligation
or duty to*do so. Here, the lessor was neither under a duty to
notify defendant of defendant's failure to pay the delay rental,
nor to give him an opportunity to repair the lapse. The' court
affirmed cancellation of the lease and allowed increase in attorney fees for the plaintiff.
In Middleton v. California Company, 2 the partial cancellation of a 4600 contiguous acre lease was sought. Plaintiff's claim
9. 237 La. 11, 110 So.2d 119 (1959).
10. 213 La. 1051, 36 So.2d 34 (1948).
11. 198 La. 101, 3 So.2d 289 (1941).
12. 237 La. 1039, 112 So.2d 704 (1959).'
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for partial cancellation, as-the court found, stemmed primarily
from the circumstance that the production had been obtained
from a small area, approximately 400 acres, when compared
with the entire acreage under lease. The court stated that the
law of the case was well settled and the issue to be resolved was
purely one of fact, that is, whether the lessee had complied with
its obligation of full development of the lease with reasonable
diligence, it being established that development of every part of
the leased property was an implied condition, and in this case,
an express condition. In holding for the defendant-lessee, the
court took into consideration the following: 17,000,000 barrels
of oil had been produced from the leased premises since 1939
from thirty producing wells; the lessee had expended over seven
million dollars in obtaining this production; that although no
new wells had been drilled on the lease within the last three
years, the lessee had conducted seismograph surveys, and had
contributed dry-hole money to adjacent wells. The court found
that the lessee had continuously developed the property. In fine,
the court found that the lessee's cautionary measures of exploration appeared to be reasonably justified under the facts presented. Justice Hamiter dissented on the ground that the lessee
had not satisfied the requisite of developing with reasonable diligence every part of the 4600 acre leased premises. This case is
in line with- prior cases as to its statement of the law, but is
another illustration of the difficulty of proving lack of reasonable development as grounds for partial cancellation.
The case of Sohio Petroleum Company v. Miller's presented
another demand for cancellation of a lease for lack of development, brought by way of reconventional demand by lessor after
institution of suit by lessee under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, seeking a determination of its rights under the lease. The
lease, granted in 1945 and having a primary term of six years,
covered three non-contiguous tracts of land.14 In 1950, after
completion of a gas well on one of the tracts, and completion of
another well on a third party's land but in the vicinity of that
tract, the major portion of that tract was included in commission units and had produced commercially since that time. In
13. 237 La. 1013, 112 So.2d 695 (1959).
14. Actually there were 7 separate tracts, but these were so situated that tracts
2 and 4 were contiguous, 3 and 5 were contiguous, and 6 and 7 were contiguous,
thereby making 3 pairs of non-contiguous tracts. Tract 1 was not contiguous
to any other tract, and was subsequently released by lessee. Therefore it is of
no importance to the case, as the court found.
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1951 and numerous times thereafter, lessor made demands on
lessee for further development or releases of the portions of the
lease not included within units. In November of 1953, lessee
made a formal demand on lessor to either resume development
within sixty days (as provided for in the lease) or be considered
in default. The lessee instituted this suit, seeking a determination of its rights under the lease; and the lessor by way of reconventional demand asked for cancellation of the lease as to
the non-producing property, and for $15,000 attorney's fees. The
lower court declared the lease valid as to the one producing tract,
and decreed that within ninety days from final judgment, lessee
shall commence drilling on both of the other non-contiguous
tracts, and in default of those operations, the lease as to those
tracts shall be forfeited. The Supreme Court reversed in part
the lower court decision and held that the lease as it affected
the other two non-producing tracts be cancelled. The court
stated that it was well settled that the main consideration of a
mineral lease is the development with reasonable diligence of
the leased premises for minerals, and the development of every
part of the lease is an implied condition. The court quoted from
an Oklahoma case15 which said: "Therefore, whether the undeveloped portion be a single tract remote from the rest, or be a
considerable portion of a very large tract ....
or the east onehundred acres of a tract of 160, it is an implied condition that
the lessee will test every part ... ." The court and the lessee dismissed the fact that the lessee had drilled a dry hole on one of
the other two tracts, and both concluded this was not sufficient
development under the facts, to satisfy lessee's obligation. Lessee did contend, however, that a contract which they had entered into with another oil company (during the above mentioned
sixty-day period) constituted compliance with lessor's demand
for development. The court found that this contract merely
granted an option to that oil company to drill on the lands under
consideration, and evidenced no binding obligation to drill. The
court, in addition to ordering cancellation of the lease as to the
two non-producing tracts, dismissed lessor's demand for attorney's fees because of lack of proof establishing that the amount
demanded was the reasonable value of the legal services rendered.
15. Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1927), which
statement was affirmed in Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 225 La. 790, 74
So.2d 30 (1954) and Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So.2d 1 (1955).
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, The-Union Oil & Gas Corp. of Louisiana v. 'Broussard'6 case

is' probably the most well-known case of this court term. The
case Was before the Supreme Court for three different hearings,
and a different result was reached on each occasion. The case
was presented as a concursus proceeding with the court having
to pass on the conflicting claims as to the ownership of a 1/24th
royalty interest.
In 1943 Niblett Farms, Inc., the then owner of the land and
minerals, conveyed a 1/24th royalty interest to third parties.
In 1948 Niblett Farms, Inc., sold the land to Mr. Broussard, but
reserved one-half of the minerals plus a 3/32nds royalty interest.
The sale provided that the 3/32nds royalty interest included as

a part thereof the outstanding 1/24th royalty interest, and when
that interest should terminate, the reversion thereof should be
for the benefit of Niblett Farms, Inc. The sale also provided
that of the reserved 3/32nds royalty interest, 2/32nds were to
be chargeable to and payable out of the one-half minerals reserved by Niblett Farms, Irc., and the other 1/32nd was to be
chargeable to and payable out of the one-half minerals conveyed
17
to Mr. BrOussard. It was the interpretation of the provisions

16. 237 La. 660, 112 'So.2d 96 (1958), noted in 20 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW
169, (1959).
i7. "(a) There is excepted from this conveyance oil, gas and other mineral
royalties and royalty rights heretofore reserved and sold to others and hereby especially reserved to the vendor in the total of 3/32nds of all of the oil, gas and other
minerals produced or to be produced and saved from the land; provided, however,
that the foregoing 3/32nds royalty interest includes as a part thereof a royalty
interest of 1/24th of the oil and gas on and under said land and to be produced
therefrom, being the same i/24th interest heretofore sold to Mrs. Sarah L. Martin,
David C. Ritchie, Mrs. Gladys C. Burchenal, Charles A. McCoy and Mrs. Gertie
Halloway, by •deed dated January 19, 1943, and recorded * * the rights of Grantor
under this additional reservation being subject to the prior sale so made, but including 'all -reversionary rights' of Grantor as the present owner of said land, it
being the intention that if and when the 1/24th royalty rights so sold should
terminate, the reversion thereof shall be for the benefit of Grantor herein whose
rights to such additional amount. of royalties shall immediately become effective.
"(b) Vendor herein reserves for itself and its successors and assigns a mineral
right interest in the said land, together with all necessary rights of ingress and
egress thereon,:equal to one-half (1/2) of the oil, gas and other minerals therein
and
thereunder,
but subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter stipulated.
."(c)
Two-thirds
(2/3) of the amount of outstanding royalties hereinabove
excepted from this conveyance, or a total of 2/32nds of all of the oil, gas and other
minerals produced from said land shall be chargeable against and payable out of
the' mineral right interest herein reserved to any by vendor; the remaining 1/32nd
royalty interest being chargeable to and deducted from the rights of the vendee
in the land herein described.
"(d) No lease shall be granted unless 1 such lease provides for sufficient
royalties payable out of the oil, gas and other minerals produced from the land
to pay all royalties outstanding on the date of this deed and which are to be
charged against the respective rights of the parties as set forth in paragraph' (c)
hereof,'and :so as to pay vendee herein, or his successors and assigns, a minimum
royalty of 1/32nd of all the oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved from
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of this contract of sale which caused the Supreme Court to hear

the case three times.
The Hawthorne Group, as the court called them, became successor to Niblett Farms, Inc., and there was a dispute between
this group and Mr. Broussard, the landowner, as to the 'ownership of the 1/24th royalty interest which had prescribed in 1953.
The Hawthorne Group contended that when the royalty interest
prescribed it inured to their benefit by the terms of the contract
of sale. Their contention was that since the 1/24th royalty interest was a charge on their one-half mineral servitude, it inured
to their benefit upon its prescription. Mr. Broussard claimed
the royalty interest as owner of the land. The district court held
that the royalty interest prescribed, and since it was apportioned
as'having been taken one-third from Mr. Broussard's one-half
minerals, and two-thirds from the Hawthorne Group's one-half
minerals, it inured to their benefit in those proportions. On appeal, the Supreme Court on original hearing reversed, holding
that Mr. Broussard, as owner of the land was entitled to the full
1/24th interest. On first rehearing, the court reversed, deciding
that upon prescription of the 1/24th royalty interest, the Hawthorne Group was entitled to the full 1/24th royalty interest,
since their 3/32nds royalty interest was no longer burdened
therewith. On second rehearing, the court again reversed, holding that since the 1/24th royalty interest had been a charge on
the entire mineral interest, it should be divided in proportion to
the mineral ownership of the parties, and therefore one-half
went to each party.
In its decision the court stated, and rightly so, that a landowner should not benefit by the prescription of a royalty interest merely because he is the; landowner. It was stated that a
royalty interest is but an appendage to a mineral right, and
upon prescription of the royalty interest, it ceases to exist and
the mineral right is relieved of its charge. Therefore, it inures
to -the benefit of the owner of the minerals and not the landowner, unless he is also a mineral owner. It may well be that
from this decision, a general rule will result whereby upon prescription of a royalty interest, that. interest will inure to the
benefitl of the owner ,of the portion of the minerals from which
the interest originated.
Adhering to its settled policy against ;reversionary interests,
the court refused to give any f6rce la"d effect: tothatProvision
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of the instrument stipulating that when the 1/24th royalty
should terminate, its reversion was for the benefit of the grantor.18 On the basis of Hicks v. Clark,19 it was held that if the
reservation of a reversionary interest in the superior right, the
mineral right, was contrary to public policy, it followed that
such a reservation of the inferior right, the royalty interest, was
likewise contrary to public policy. However, the court, after so
holding, said that if there had been production during the life
of the 1/24th royalty interest, that interest would have been
taken from the Hawthorne Group's 3/32nds royalty interest.
This implies that although the Hawthorne Group could have been
held to pay the 1/24th interest had it become due, they could not
benefit by its prescription. Apparently the court allowed the
clause in the contract of sale to stand as far as the vendor's assumption of liability for payment of the debt, but not as to its
beneficial provision of reaping gain on the prescription of that
debt. Being a charge on all of the minerals, as the court stated,
it seems strange that the 1/24th royalty interest could have been
charged against the owner of one-half of the minerals had it not
prescribed, and yet that mineral owner could benefit by only onehalf of the 1/24th royalty interest when that interest did prescribe.
Another issue presented for decision, not given in the brief
facts above, was the effect of an instrument executed by one of
the Hawthornes just prior to the prescription of the 1/24th royalty interest. In that instrument one of the Hawthornes, who
owned 9/32nds of the minerals, declared that he "reactivated"
a certain fraction of the 1/24th interest. The court, unfortunately in the writer's opinion, gave effect to this instrument as
an acknowledgment with intent to interrupt as to that certain
fraction. However, if "reactivation" meant a new contract or
a renegotiation, the decision is in line with cases on servitudes.
The following cases were also decided during the year but
contained little germane to the prime subject of this resume
of cases: Daigle v. Pan American Production Co.20 and B/as2
ingame v. Anderson. '
the property.

Should any lease to be negotiated in the future provide for total

royalties in excess of the usual 1/8th, then the amount of royalties in excess
thereof shall then be divided between and belong to vendor and vendee, or their
respective successors or assigns, in equal proportions." Id. at 664, 112 So.2d at 9T.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See paragraph (a) in note 17 8upra.
225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
236 La. 578, 108 So.2d 516 (1958).
236 'La. 505, 108 So.2d 105 (1959).

